



COLLÈGE  
DE FRANCE  
1530

CHAIRE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET  
PHILOSOPHIE DE LA CONNAISSANCE  
Année académique 2017-2018  
Pr Claudine TIERCELIN

Le Groupe d'Études Métaphysiques (GEM) invite

**Eric T. Olson**  
(University of Sheffield)


**Vendredi 19 janvier 2018, 14h-18h**  
Collège de France, Salle 1

*Entrée libre, sans inscription préalable, dans la limite des places disponibles*



## Workshop in honour of Eric T. Olson

- 14h00 **Eric T. OLSON**, University of Sheffield  
**The Metaphysics of Artificial Intelligence**
- 15h00 Discussion
- 15h45 Break
- 16h00 **Jean-Baptiste GUILLON**, Collège de France  
**Three Theories of Coincident Entities**
- 17h00 Discussion



Eric T. Olson, *Que sommes-nous? Sur la nature métaphysique des personnes*, trad. B. Gaultier, Paris, Ithaque, 2017

Eric T. Olson, *The Metaphysics of Artificial Intelligence*

Debates about the possibility of artificial intelligence have focused on the question of whether programming a computer in the right way could produce genuine thought. But for there to be thought is for there to be thinking beings. What sort of being might be made intelligent by programming a computer? Would it be the computer itself--a physical object? Some part of the computer? The program running on the computer? Or something else? There has been almost no discussion of this question. Yet if artificial intelligence is possible, it must have an answer. A satisfying account is elusive.

Jean-Baptiste Guillon, *Three Theories of Coincident Entities*

Materialists and (compound) Dualists agree on the view that human beings have *parts*. Furthermore, it seems that they can *lose* some of their parts, and come to be coincident with what (formerly) was a part of them. This is the traditional « amputation paradox » (starring Dion and Theon in its Stoic version). One of the solutions to this paradox is to say that sometimes two entities (e.g. Dion and its former part Theon) can become coincident while remaining numerically distinct. In fact, there are three distinct versions of this solution: the Constitution View, the Unique Part View, and Mereological Hylomorphism. Unlike many philosophers who retain only the first solution, Eric Olson discusses all three theories. I will enter this discussion about the relative merits of the three theories, and I will propose new arguments and my personal ranking.

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