



Artistic concentration in Paris and its dilemnas Monsieur Pierre-Michel Menger

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Abstract

Paris' position in artistic creation is situated at the junction of a long history of centralization of culture in France and the contemporary movement for internationalization of production of goods and cultural services.

This evolution stands out first of all against a background of the differentiated demand in consumption of artistic and cultural events. In France, apart from television, there is a clear decreasing geographic gradient in all consumption, from the City of Paris, to the «petite couronne», the «grande couronne», and lastly the provinces. This spatial distribution is quite clearly different from that seen in the United States, where the ubiquity of the high level cultural offer contrasts with the relative concentration of popular culture in the large centers, particularly in the South and the West. New York is the exception in this picture through its noticeable presence in every type of culture.

These concentration processes are also reflected in the concentration of cultural production : 70 % of the artists in France live in the capital, with two thirds of these in Paris City. This concentration only reflects the structural advantages of the big metropolises : flexibility and richness of contacts, unpredictability and indétermination in creativity, reduction in the transactional production costs. These characteristics, however, occur in France on specific and contradictory political trends : permanent praise to the capital, and an ideal of democratization leading to more geographic diffusion. In the eighties, administrative decentralization and tightening of State expenses on large Parisian cultural investments only served to aggravate these two logics, which can strengthen the discrimination in the qualitative and quantitative distribution of the demand. But the internationalization and world competition established since then in artistic production must relativize these iniquities, which are also sources of economic profit.

Résumé

La place de de Paris dans le création artistique se situe à l'articulation d'une longue histoire de centralisation de la culture en France et du mouvement contemporain d'internationalisation de la production des biens et des services culturels.

Cette évolution se projette d'abord sur fond de demande différenciée de la consommation d'événements artistiques, et culturels. Il existe en France, sauf pour la télévision, un gradient géographique net de décroissance de toutes les consommations, de Paris intra muros, à la petite couronne, à la grande couronne, et enfin à la province. Cette distribution spatiale est assez nettement différente de celle constatée aux États-Unis, où l'ubiquité de l'offre culturelle de haut niveau contraste avec la relative concentration de la culture populaire dans les grands centres, notamment du Sud et de l'Ouest. New York fait d'ailleurs exception dans ce tableau par sa présence remarquable dans tous les types de cultures.

Ces processus de concentration se reflètent aussi dans la concentration de la production culturelle : 70 % des artistes vivant en France résident dans la capitale, dont les deux tiers dans Paris intra muros. Cette concentration ne fait que traduire les avantages structurels des grandes métropoles : flexibilité et richesse des contacts, imprévision et indétermination de la créativité, réduction des coûts transactionnels de la production.

Mais ces caractéristiques se déroulent en France sur des tendances politiques spécifiques et contradictoires : hymne permanent à la capitale, et idéal de démocratisation conduisant à plus de diffusion géographique. Dans les années quatre-vingt, la décentralisation administrative et le resserrement des dépenses de l'État sur les grands investissements culturels parisiens n'ont fait qu'exacerber ces deux logiques, qui peuvent renforcer la discrimination dans la répartition qualitative et quantitative de la demande. Mais l'internationalisation et la compétition mondiale instaurées désormais dans la production artistique doivent faire relativiser ces iniquités, qui sont aussi sources de profits économiques.



Pierre-Michel MENGER Résumé : La concentration artistique à Paris et ses contradictions

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ARTISTIC CONCENTRATION IN PARIS AND ITS DILEMMAS

Pierre-Michel MENGER*

■ In matters of culture, affinities and homogeneous comparisons would bring Paris close to London or Vienna, rather than to New York or Tokyo, because of the historical importance the three cities had in the development of great art sectors as well as because of their identity as capitals and because of the similar relationships that existed between their respective centralized cultural markets and the concentration of the influence of the social and political elite in the art world. Like London and Vienna, Paris built and consolidated its leading position in French cultural space by being the artistic and intellectual center, the political and administrative capital, as well as the center of economic activity. Paris has greater historical and geographic influence, if one considers the whole of artistic production.

Positing Tokyo and New York as poles of comparison leads essentially to examining the articulation between the heritage of a long history of centralizing the cultural market and the contemporary movement to internationalize the production and the movement of artistic goods and services. This movement expresses itself particularly by a reinforced competition in the economically preponderant sectors of cultural production, the entertainment industries (cinema, audiovisuel, music) linked to the material and service industries by a growth of transactions and the flux of exchanges on the art market, and by the development of a policy of extensive works, which in particular symbolize the will of the government to strengthen Paris's position in the international art world.

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DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF CULTURE

Let us quickly summarize the present situation of Paris and the French cultural space.

The demand Side

As for demand, the results of national surveys about the Loisirs des Français (INSEE - Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques) and about Les pratiques Culturelles des Français (Ministry of Culture), and the analysis of household budgets allow us to measure the affinities between the exceptional concentration of the supply and the very specific spending habits of Parisians.

The differences which separate the cultural habits of Parisians from those of the suburbanites, and even more so from that of the inhabitants of large French cities, is explained both by the structural effests and by the incentives of supply. The structural effects explain the concentration in the capital of a population who on average is more educated and wealthier than that of the provinces: for example, a recent survey of INSEE indicates that the annual income in the households of the Ile-de-France region exceed that of the provinces by 28% (*Le Monde*, 16 July 1991). This explains that the Parisian spend considerably more on cultural events and products; they spend 50% more than the average French person according to a recent study (*Les dépenses culturelles des ménages*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1989, p. 25-26)

The parisian population is different also in that it contains high numbers of group who are direct targets of the elite cultural supply provided by public financing: intellectual and scientific professionals, professors, artistic and para-artistic professionnals, executives of the public sector, students, all categories who have a stronger and more diversified demand, inclined to take risks in cultural matters, notably out of interest in contemporary creativity and openess to innovation.

Attendance in last 12 months	Paris	Petite couronne*	Grande couronne**	Cities + 100 000 inhabitants	Total population
Cinema > 3 times/month 1-3 times/month	16,1% 29,5%	7,3% 21,7%	6,2% 21,0%	4,3% 16,3%	3,9% 15,1%
Theater > 1/year	44,3%	20,3%	15,4%	10,8%	10,6%
Classical Music-Opera > 1/year 1/year	16,7% 16,5%	6,1% 11,6%	6,0% 10,1%	6,6% 8,8%	5,1% 7,4%
Concert: Rock, Jazz > 1/year 1/year	15,7% 13,9%	8,9% 13,6%	8,7% 11,9%	7,2% 9,6%	5,9 <i>%</i> 8,9 <i>%</i>
Music Hall/Variety Show > 1/year 1/year	26,0% 13,2%	25,0% 14,8%	21,6% 10,5%	18,1% 9,8%	15,9% 9,3%
Museums > 3/year 2-3/year	30,4% 18,1%	12,4% 13,5%	11,4% 10,8%	7,7% 9,9%	7,0% 9,2%
Art Exhibits > 3/year 2-3/year	21,3% 18,1%	6,6% 9,6%	4,1% 9,7%	6,9% 8,2%	5,5% 7,6%
Chateaux, Monuments > 3/year 2-3/year	18,8% 20,3%	12,6% 18,1%	13,7% 17,7%	9,3% 10,6%	8,7% 11,5%

Table 1: Attendance at shows and cultural events

Petite couronne designates the departments of Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, and Val-de-Marne.
 Grande couronne designates the departments of Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines, Essonne, and Val-d'Oise.

Rate of use and ownership	Paris	Petite couronne	Grande couronne	Cities + 100 000 inhabitants	Total population
Listening to music > 1 hour/day 1 hour/week - 1 hour/day	9,6% 47,9%	9,9% 45,1%	9,2% 46,1%	7,9% 40,0%	7,4% 36,4%
Reading > 2 books/month 1-2 books/month	26,5% 25,2%	18,5% 17,5%	16,1% 23,8%	15,0% 20,5%	- 13,9% 17,5%
Watching TV Each day or almost	75,5%	85,4%	83,8%	81,4%	82,7%
Own TV	85,8%	94,75%	94,8%	93,0%	93,8%
Own Stereo	51,2%	51,8%	55,3%	44,9%	40,8%
Own CD player	12,4%	8,5%	8,1%	5,6%	5,1%
Books owned + 250 books 51-251 books	33,1% 32,0%	25,6% 38,6%	25,2% 38,0%	14,5% 35,3%	15,2% 34,1%

Table 2: Possession and use of goods produced by entertainment industries

Source: INSEE Survey, Loisirs des Français.

But the differences in buying power do not explain everything: the household budgets show that culture represents 4,6% of spending in a Parisian household, compared to 3,4% of the national average. In checking the factor of social position, or by comparing individualss of identical socio-professionnal categories, living in the Paris area and the provinces, respectively, the 1988-89 survey of the Ministry of Culture shows that "depending on the categories, the gaps of access to "la culture de sorties" (frequenting the theater, concerts, museums, exhibits, etc.) range between 21 points (the executives) and 28 points (employees and workers)" (O. Donnat, D. Cogneau, *Les pratiques culturelles des Français*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1990, p. 217). The effect of the supply is obvious: the quantity, the variety, the availability and the speed of renewing the cultural supply in all that does not depend on audiovisual support, have a direct encouraging value, so the quality and speed of circulating cultural information broadcasted by the media or transmitted by social interaction. These traits largely determine the exceptionnal characteristic of cultural use in the French capital.

On the contrary, the differences are much weaker in the rate of using audiovisual services and products (cf. table 2). They are quite the inverse in the case of television. Parisians own fewer televisions and watch it less than all other French people.

The gap between Paris and the rest of the metropolitan area should be the object of separate judgements, beyond simply stating the specificity of Parisian cultural habits. On one hand, the surveys treat a complex and socially contrasted urban fabric as a homogeneous group; on the other hand, the dynamic of the Parisian concentration of the supply acts on the cultural initiative of the suburban communes which favor developing the supply (measurable by the volume of institutions and cultural events and by the number of artists and professionals of the cultural trades, settled in the communes), and which stimulate innovation and risk taking in the cultural supply, on a level that is noticeably superior to that which one would expect in the sizeable cities, social composition, political management and a level of comparable local resources, outside such an urban environment.

The opposite view was tested by Judith Blau in her book (*The shape of Culture: a study of contemporary cultural patterns in the United States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). Let me briefly discuss her findings and interpretation, and state some critical propositions regarding the critical mass effect.

Judith Blau studied patterns of cultural supply in the american metropolities, and more specifically the relationships between social and demographic conditions and cultural supply in the 125 largest US cities (metropolitan areas). She builded a frame of quantitative indicators to describe the supply side: that is the numbers of a wide range of high and popular culture intitutions or events, and the numbers of cultural workers (artists and art worlds professionals). And she sought for correlations with the size and socio-demographic characteristics of the resident populations taken as indicators of the cultural demand level.

The main findings are surprising.

At the metropolitan as well as at the regional level, although the largest cities are better equipped with elite arts institutions than smaller ones, high culture is quite uniformely distribued if one takes into account numbers of organizations relative to the

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population size. For example, per capita ratings give the first rank to Augusta for the number of major orchestras, to Charleston for opera companies, or to Providence for highly rated museums, but to New York only for a few other major elite arts supply indicators.

Of course, and this is clearly emphasized limitation of this kind of computation, such comparisons and rankings do not take into account the quality or size of the institutions. In fact, such rankings correspond to a kind of potential consumer point of view facing ticket availability or hall congestion problems with no respect to reputation and worth of the performances and shows.

Ubiquitous high culture supply contrasts with the relative concentration of commercial, popular culture in major centers and with regional variations in its spatial distribution.

Explanation:

"High culture, Janet Minihan notes, provides a base of legitimacy for government and for elites because the arts symbolize a bridge between the rich and the poor, and exert moral and educational influences. They also have economic value as they are presumed to attract tourism and play a role in the efforts of cities everywhere to stimulate commercial growth and reverse the flight of the middle class to suburbia.

For these reasons, it is not surprising that high art has been dislodged from its traditional enclaves and widely disseminated throughout the United States. Because it transcends the traditions of the local community and dignifies the activities for political and economic actors, art is a safe investment. The same could be said of any growing city, and when political and economic elites act in concert to develop cultural resources they can ignore local tastes and overcome initial handicaps.

On the other hand, popular culture is shaped according to free market principles. Competition among cultural industries within a given locale will set an equilibrium based on what the market will bear, and market research is carried out with an eye to local demand and taste. The demographic and lifestyle characteristics that prevail in the sunbelt cities of the southern and western regions are probably major factors that explain the prevalence of forms of popular culture in these regions. Thus high culture has become more popular in the sense of being more widely distributed than what we call "popular culture". "Commercial, popular culture is more concentrated in a few places than is elite culture. Nashville, Salt Lake City and Little Rock are major centers for cinemas, bands, commercial orchestras, commercial theaters, dance halls, and variety entertainment (such as nightclubs, burlesque and vaudeville)".

Statistical correlations with socio-economic and educational characteristics of populations provide another surprise: popular and elite culture are governed by about the same conditions; that is low and declining levels of class inequalities do favor the institutional expansion of both cultures.

These and several other findings bring Blau close to Gans thesis of the emergence of a new taste culture, a middle culture: an urban middle culture dominates now, since rising levels of education and urbanization have strenghtened the role of a large middle class for stimulating cultural demand. People aged 25 to 34 in 1970 form the cohort that was the main actor of this change.

Such results run counter to most surveys showing the significance of class inequalities for cultural demand —in terms of actual consumption and preference patterns— as well as for the distinction between elite and popular art. They also run counter to what would be predicted by theories of urban dominance, central place theory, mass culture theory, and by common observations.

But there are several contradictions in Blau's interpretation of the empirical findings. For example, Blau's own findings lead to contradiction on one important point: if one represents the level of cultural supply by the relative number of artists living in the cities, the picture becomes very different, since "places with notable affluence, considerable poverty and great inequalities attract artists" (p. 167), especially performing artists.

In our view, these challenging and sometimes contradictory findings stem from an arbitrary and at least partially problematic assumption: the "societal level", which Blau refers to in order to resolve conflicting views on the relationships between society and culture, leads her to identify potential cultural demand (i.e. the size of the whole population) with actual demand, "ceteris paribus", as stated or assumed several times. This identification is clearly confusing in the case of high culture. Blau herself exhibits a

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"threshold" or "critical mass" effect: relation between size increase of the city population and increase of the numbers of suppliers, while linear in the case of popular culture, is multiplicative for elite arts institutions. In other words, popular culture depends directly on market forces and consumer sovereignty, when high culture, much less consumed, needs a larger pool of potential consumers to develop. National and local cultural policy investments and the coordinated action of political and economic elites tend to limit the effects of this gap between potential and actual demand for the supply of high culture ressources. Though mentioned several times, such intermediate factors are inaccessible to the methodology adopted and so undervalued.

So could be explained the exception (although seen as a partial exception, since no quality index is taken into account) of New York that Judith Blau's acknowledges a little bit reluctantly:

"A possible exception is New-York, which does rate high on several cultural indicators, there is little evidence for the concentration of elite arts in a few major metropolitan areas.

The perception that New York City is the pre-eminent cultural center is somewhat justified by these results. Even when taking into account its large population size, it has the highest number of specialized galleries, theater premieres, chamber music groups, and modern dance companies of all large metropolitan places, and it does also well in supporting many nonprofit theaters and ensembles. But surprisingly it does not appear in the top ranked places with respect to other major elite art indicators, including ballet, major orchestras, and art museums."

The supply side

A series of sectorial evaluations will reveal the concentration in the Parisian agglomeration and even within Paris itself of the major institutions of education, art, diffusion and conservation of art, activities of conception and realization of products of the cultural industry (cinema, television, publishing, recording), and a strong majority of diverse categories of professionals of the world. For those who would like to leave the half scholarly, half intuitive register of global analysis, as it concerns the historical continuity of the Parisian hegemony in the sphere of cultural production, it would be, without a doubt, technically difficult to construct an indication of the concentration of French cultural life in the capital for a long historical period.

Sectorial indications furnish us a rather good approximation of the concentration of human resources that artistic production directly implies for the most recent period. Various surveys¹ about the populations of contemporary writers, composers, visual artists, cinematic authors, movie directors and art photographers living in France have shown that 40 to 50% of them were born in Paris or in the area around Paris (compared to 12% of the total French population, according to the 1982 census); this percentage reaches 50% if one counts only those artists born in France. The indications about their residences are even more clear: Paris and its region, on average, attract 70 to 80% of the artists (more than 2/3 of whom live inside Paris), while 19,8% of the working population lives in the Paris area, 3,85% of it in Paris. The performance artists (actors, musicians, dancers, singers), who make up the largest numbers of the population of art professionals, are concentrated in Paris and its region in comparable proportions: nearly 70% of entertainment and audiovisual artists and technicians live there as well according to the 1982 census. Available monographic surveys about the various segments of the population of performance artists confirm this number, as the proportion waver between 60 and 80% according to the profession.

This concentration of talents expresses the characteristics that are distinctive to the atistic labor market and the conditions of access to success and reputation: the French model of education, of selection and establishment of artistic talents essentially remains a pyramid shaped structure centered in Paris. The sectors of cultural production —cultural industries of books, film, audiovisual, visual arts— as well as commercial performance segments (theater, song...) find multiple guarantees of viability and effectiveness because of the concentration of these activities in Paris: the presence of the majority of artists of a variety of disciplines, the presence of information and evaluation groups, the effectiveness of being brought together in a context of heightened international cultural competition. The non-commercial sectors, protected by market laws, find an essential condition of their development in the demands of excellence and cultural prestige attached to the capital's role.

Artistic concentration in Paris and its dilemmas

Why are so many artists concentrated in the biggest cities, without any evident indication of decrease over time? Concentration of artists and cultural producers in the largest cities refers to the idiosyncratic production process in the arts:

1) The need for flexibility stems from the high level of product differentiation and the overhead cost reduction schemes (subcontracting, short term contracts, casual work).

The major part of the production of artistic works and performances runs on the organizational basis that been identified as one of the hallmarks of the postfordist era, the flexibility basis. Since cultural production implies the highest level of product differentiation or a prototype production process requiring each time partially or totally new combinations of skills, talents, material and human resources, flexibility accounts for the way things are generally accomplished, people gathered, projects defined and completed and teams dismantled until the next project. Permanent cultural organizations clearly exist but they represent only a limited part of the production capacity, and they could'nt survive without organizational flexibility (subcontracting, temporary personal, short-term contracts and several means for reducing overhead costs). The flexibility requirement means that a large pool of artistic and technical workers be available, ready to be hired as long as it is necessary and to bear the costs of oversupply of labor force and of discontinuity in the career process.

2) The unpredictability of the markets for cultural goods and services encourages overproduction of new works, and therefore a structural excess in supply of artistic work.

Despite some popular views about the easy construction of success ans manipulation of consumer preferences, demand appears to be highly uncertainty about success is overproduction of new works, which leads to a excess in supply of artists in the labor market of the culture industries.

3) The high valuation of artistic excellence and innovation together with the indetermination of artistic competition explain the large number of risk-taking candidates to artistic careers, the scarcity of success and the need for professional risk diversification devices for the bulk of low successful artists and cultural producers.

Let's consider the criterion of excellence. Artistic achievement and art value emerge through competition. It is because conditions of success are quite indeterminate that so many candidates enter the artistic labor market and try to understand why cultural entrepreneurs (publishers, art dealers, movie and record producers and the like) constantly are in search of new talents and make new bets. But those talents who are recognized as good or as the best ones, whatever definition of excellence one takes, are necessarily scarce. Excellence is so highly valued that demand is strongly biased to those artists who appear to be the internationalization, this bias has two correlated effects: a growing number of candidates to artistic careers enter the labor market, but the dispersion of earnings is also much greater since successful artists earn much more now than in dispersion of earnings and by the fame they can get in such a game. For all those maintain themselves in the pool of personal to be hired is to make up a portfolio of diverse activities and resources (artistic, para-artistic and non artistic activities, family or friends subsidies, or state support, or spouse's steady income, and the like). Clearly, the largest cities offer the best opportunities for managing this portfolio because of the size and diversity of the labor markets providing new or additional jobs, and because of the density of interindividual networks conveying information about new projects, or about new potential patrons etc.

All in all, this analysis fits quite well Storper and Walker's theoretical views of the city as a territorial mode of production organisation. As Storper and Walker argue:

"Cities allow a degree of integration of production with a minimum of central control and a maximum of flexibility (...). Industries are essentially groups of production activities held together by some form of governance system and almost always involve multiple production units and many firms. Those relationships can have geographically-sensitive cost structures, particulary where transactional relationship between production units are especially dense. The greater the costs per transaction, the greater the probability that firms will agglomerate in order to reduce them. Three types of transactions are especially affected by distance: those that cannot be standardized —that is, are unforeseeable— and require frequent search and recognition (these appear where markets and products designs change frequently); small-scale linkages which cannot enjoy volume discounts on transport costs; and problematic linkages that must be resolved through personal contacts or renegotiation.

Urban concentration benefits producers in four main dimensions. The city improves exchange by making comparison easier, by pooling diverse buyers, sellers, and information, and by letting buyers and sellers get to know and trust each other personally, and complete specialized or extended transactions. It is where you go to be on top of the action, to find the merchants, brokers and others who are in the know about market conditions, which is especially valuable in uncertain or rapidly-changing markets (underlined by me, P-M. M). Spatial concentration aids inter-workplace integration by facilitating worker movement between sites, managerial oversight, information transfer, evaluation and feedback across disparate parts of related production activities. The city keeps firms on top of technological know-how by letting them stay abreast of the latest information, draw on the most diverse and creative suppliers of components and solutions. Cities are, finally, great labor markets for workers of the most varied skills, whirpools of humanity (...); they also tend to draw too much labor and keep a surplus available."

Think of the spatial concentration of the motion picture producers not only in Paris, but in the 8th district of Paris, or of the main french publishers on the left bank of the Seine, in the fifth, sixth, seventh, thirteenth and fourtenth districts, or of the art galleries in the fourth, sixth, eighth, and eleveenth parisian districts. These examples show that even in renewing itself, the culture industry develops along schemes that correspond to the need for flexibility, transaction costs reduction through dense networks of personal contacts and interactions that convey information and provide trust in such information channel. In that sense, we can say our global cities act as germinating grounds for cultural innovations, because of the availability of "versatile industrial centers" (quoted in Storper and Walker, op. cit.).

CULTURAL POLITICS AND THEIR TENSION

The French paradigm of cultural life is inseparable from public intervention in the arts. The prominent features of this model sum up the contradictions in which a strong, centralized state run democracy with elevated cultural ambitions has been caught. The government that supports new activities by supplying the ability to finance themselves to powerfess artistic sectors, must arbitrate between the hegemony of the capital and the

concentration of public cultural investments in Paris, which bring in prestige for the country and consolidate its rank in international cultural life, on one hand, and the ideals of ideal democratization on the other.

The only political solution to act simultaneously on both plans -broadening the number and the social and geographic diversity of those who benefit from public cultural action, consolidating the rank of France in international cultural competition -is tooo significantly increase public investments. This in turn helps to orchestrate decentralization through the incentives of governmental policy on the action of local elected officials (according to various plans and modalities of negociations and of coordination of the operations and management of public services with multiple public financing) and to develop and modernize the public cultural institutions of Paris, symbols of artistic excellence.

Let us examine the budgetary data coming from the analysis of public state depending and territorial collectivities' expenditures on cultural matters (cf. tables 3, 4 and 5). The analysis of the cultural spending of local collectivities (communes, departements, régions, according to French administrative divisions) shows the extent of influence that governmental policies exert on the dynamism of local financial support of cultural events. In order to measure the importance of the evolution that has occured in this domain, I must describe the respective weights of state and local spending in France. Table 3 shows public spending on cultural events for 1987.

State Ministry of Culture Other Ministries	15,5 9,0	38,7 22,5
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	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· · · ·
	illions of francs)	

Table 3: Analysis of cultural expenditures of public collectivities in 1987

Source: "Évolution des dépenses culturelles des communes", in Développement culturel, n°85, ministère de la Culture, mai 1990.

Type of admin. unit	1984	1987
State	43,3%	38,7%
Local	56,7%	61,3%

Table 4: Compared breakdown of administrative units' cultural expendituresin 1984 and 1987

Source: "Évolution des dépenses culturelles des communes", in Développement culturel, n°85, ministère de la Culture, mai 1990.

As table 4 points out, state spending on cultural events increased less quickly than local spending. In this development it is especially the incentive spending of the Ministry of Culture that is remarkable. If the Ministry's budget more than doubled (*en francs constants*) between 1981 and 1987, the budget of the *communes* and the *départements* experienced an almost equal increase, even if the "take off" of *commune* spending began at the end of the 70's, when the policy of cultural decentralization became broader in scope. Time constraints do not allow me to detail the mechanisms by which the state encouraged local administrative units, suffice it to say that multiple procedures of co-financing came into being and linked the action of the Parisian cultural administration to local initiatives: it is also appropriate to observe that through these forms of partnerships, the state accomplished a sort of decentralization, by persuading or often forcing the local decision makers to adopt the best criteria of the Parisian cultural administration².

In the 80's, years of exceptionally strong growth of public favor for culture in France, the money spent by the Ministry of Culture on Paris and the provinces breaks down in the following manner:

	1981	1986	1988
Paris	44,3%	55,6%	57,3%
Ile-de-France	15,5%	11,5%	10,2%
Provinces	40,2%	32,9%	32,5%

Table 5: Analysis of expenditures of the ministry of Culture in Paris, the Île-de-France region, and the provinces 1981-1988

Source: La Politique culturelle de la France, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1988, for the 1981 statistics, and ministère de la Culture, Département d'Études et de Prospectives, for the 1986 and 1988 statistics.

The paradox of decentralization orchestrated by a welfare state starting at the capital and moving down, the statistic of which are given in table 5, begins directly in the importance given to the "grands travaux" of the budget of the Ministry of Culture. The cumulative effect of the concentration major cultural investments in Paris, throughout history, is today all the more perceptible, as the constraints of upkeep and renewal of this imposing inheritence started an ambitious policy of great undertakings consisting in large part in modernizing the most prestigious institutional stock a decade ago (Opéra, Musée du Louvre, Conservatoire de Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, etc.)

Philippe Urfalino proposes to study the "grands chantiers" in a triple perspective of international comparison. The framework of symbolic references, such as the prospectus and decision criteria make clear, manifest the tension between an objective of international bearing —to secure Paris a pre-eminent role in the distinguished cultural market— and the ambition of revitalizing the cultural and architectural policies of the nation, referring to events and places symbolic of national history. One can observe this very tension between the international and national dimensions of such operations in the way projects are conducted, especially through the mobilization of foreign talent to work for their competion: thus the cultural voluntarism of the French state will participate only in a limited fashion in the expression of a "French" architecture. Finally, the study of the decision making mechanism shows the gap between the action taken by the government and that the Parisian municipality, each having different responsabilities for the double vocation of a capital.

A Parisian hegemony, strenghtened by the cultural action of the state, theorically violates not only the principle of decentralization, but the principle of democratization as well, as the supply in the cultural sectors that are the most dependent on public favor (classical concerts, theater, dance, opera, art exhibits and museums) reaches a qualitative and quantitative level in Paris. That is far superior to the supply in the regional capitals: as table 1 and 2 show, the demand for the supply come mostly from the wealthlest, best educated, and most cultured social groups which are over-represented in Paris.

To relativize the bearing of criticism against this double breach in social and geographic equity, the economic argument designating the arts as semi-public goods is regularly invoked and continually motivates and relegitimizes the structurally inegalitarian allocation of public resources to the cultural sector. The arts can be defined as mixed

goods —that is, public and private— if one admits that, although used by private people, they conceal important "public externalities". Among these "externalities" are: indirect economic benefits procured when artistic activities increase and thrive; the cultural supply contributes to the life of a city by attracting tourists and customers and by favoring the establishment of businesses, and registered offices of firms, especially of those in the tertiary sector. Groups whose activities and presence in a city provide an obvious interest for the city (intellectuals, art professionals, the professions) demand that art be at their disposal and actively participate in it: the importance and the diversity of the artistic offering can affect the decision of such groups of the active population to reside inside the city. The artistic enterprises are themselves, directly or indirectly, suppliers of jobs, and the labor market benefits from them. Spending money on art benefits the city and its region through the direct productive effects on local economic and commercial activities; the arts and culture have an important part in the affirmation and the consolidation of the national identity, and in the search for prestige in the country on the international level. Lastly, we must take future generations into consideration. Present generations are responsible for continuing the activity of artistic creation and for distributing works for the future. Current support can directly determine the existence, the variety, the quantity and the quality of the future supply of these goods. It suffices to observe the importance of works handed down from past generations of creators in nations with a high artistic tradition to comprehend in what the vitality of artistic production in the important art capitals includes a dimension of betting on the future. It can affect the chances of artists to enter their names on the international roll of honor, and for some to remain there and take their place in history.

The first category of justifications can be amply discussed, as it applies to any public expenditure in any city. One of the classic objections to it is that the argument of externalities is better only in relative terms. Those who dispute the idea that cultural products are more effective than other services in attracting visitors and tourists to a city say that different uses of expenditures can produce similar results.

It is different for the last two arguments, which in common invoke other consumers or arbiters who benefit, not only the members of the social community residing in the sity in question: future generations of consumers and implied consumer-citizens of the international cultural economic competition between nations. In these two cases, the excellence of the cultural supply is a cardinal dimension, and the organization of art markets, based on selecting and rating works ans artists, designate the capital as the best "ecological" site.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CULTURAL MARKETS

The argument which invokes the ownership of public or semi-public goods to legitimize the concentration of cultural spending can be considered an element of an ideological and political revision of the doctrine of the cultural welfare state, as regards the relationship art-economy and as regards the intervention of public action. To ascertain that the socialist left, responsible for the very strong progression of public expenditures on culture in France beginning with its rise to power in 1981, operated the revision, is only seemingly paradoxal.

On one hand, a new form of "cultural accountancy" that first seeks to quantify and forsee the economic "fallout" of operations and prestige investments —supplementary tourists flux, the growth induced by purchasing goods and services, incentives to the national use of cultural goods, support of the artistic labor market— and in consequence to modify the management policy of the cultural establishments that are directly concerned has developped.

On the other hand, the increased power of public action in France took place in the period when cultural industries created a market of strong cultural use. The plans to democratize high culture admitted their limits when the strategies to segment the supply according to the most prominent feature of the demand (notably age) supported the development of entertainment industries: music, audiovisual, cinema. Without abandoning its ideal of regulatory intervention in such markets, the French cultural policy of the 1980's drew some lessons from the contrasts between the implicit segmentation (the subsidized supply of elite culture is directed only to a small assiduous group of the social body) and explicit segmentation (that which results from a deliberate construction, a targeting of a specific public group, such as the music and audiovisual industries practice it).

Artistic concentration in Paris and its dilemmas

Finally, the universality of artistic values is no longer a simple heading of the humanist creed celebrating the educational and civilizing virtues of art. The image of a very international Pantheon of major glories of artistic creation would remain led to a system of symbols of prestige and to the respective contributions that nations make to the enrichment of a universal heritage. Today, the internationalization of intellectual, scientific, and cultural life (the intensification of movements of exhange between countries and different continents, the westernization of ways of life in countries experiencing economic expansion, the speed with which cultural items circulate, the world wide application of the commerce of works of art and outlets for the widespread use and appeal of audiovisual and musical production) makes the cultural competition between the most developed nations and between their respective artistic industries and markets more acute. The transformation of the way the art markets operate, especially the fact of this growing internationalization, lead not only the agents of these markets, but also the public administration, promoter of the French model of mixed cultural economy, to take into account the economic and financial dimensions of international artistic competition.

This evolution counts on the different modalities of state intervention. It protects sectors that are structurally powerless to finance themselves. It performs entrepreneurial and regulatory functions in sectors such as audiovisual where two concurrent models of production —public and private— coexist. It plays a regulatory and advising role in the cultural industry and in the art market, notably by the legal and reglementary framing of the market and by the role of institutional investor, which the state assumes in financing the purchase of contemporary art for museums and public cultural institutions.

The example of the sector of the visual arts is particularly eloquent. Since the 1950's, Paris has lost its position as leader of the contemporary art market, to the benefit of London and New York. In order to correct this change and to permit French artists and the Parisian art market to recapture a dominant position, the state has spared no expense. In 1977, the Musée National d'Art Moderne in the Centre Pompidou was created, engendring the multiplication of contemporary art galleries in the surrounding Beaubourg district. Starting in 1981 a massive public intervention in favor of contemporary art developed and had the remarkable particularity of implicating the state in the support of sales activities and in the invention of outlets for selling contemporary avant-garde works, by an unprecedented policy of purchasing and public orders of works that are

representative of international contemporary art³. In France, such were the recent principal stages of the passage to a mixed cultural economy in a domain which heretofore was essentially governed by the laws of the markets. This public investment can be justified in effect owing both to tutelary role of the welfare state in matters of artistic creation (the state wants to be the garant of the flourishing of reputedly difficult arts and on the cultural prestige of the nation) and to the well known economic reason that supporting a sector of activities traditionally endowed with a positive commercial balance presents (French exports more art than it imports —in 1988 the total amount of art exports rose to 3 149 millions francs and imports rose to 1 416 millions francs.

If the transformation of the Parisian visual arts market progressively concerned the entire country with the creation of new museums and contemporary art centers and regional of contemporary art, they are, however, the choices made by the Parisian world of visual arts (dealers, critics, conservators, collectors, members of the cultural bureaucracy), which continue to inspire the provincial initiatives by imposing the criteria of evaluation and consecration, created by the international community of contemporary art, it is rather of the interdependence between the freat cities that are most active in this market (New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Madrid, Milan, Cologne, Zurich) that we must speak, even if the importance of the American market, its artists, its dealers, its collectors, and its museums and collections of contemporary art still make New York the center of this network.

Let us signal, without having the time to develop this point, that the most spectacular challenges facing the mixed cultural economy whose symbol is Paris, definitely concerns the audiovisual and program industry (tv, cinema, music), a market largely dominated by American production, and in which European activity is very weak⁴. The actions engaged by the productors of cinema and television and French public strength attest to it, on economic and financial levels, but also on the reglementary and legislative level, through negociations with the commission of the EEC, about the respective percentages of European works of fiction in the television programs of European countries. To maintain and strengthen an audiovisual pole of production in Paris in time to support competition with the American programs industry is an objective all the micro pressing as American exports have not ceased to increase in Europe since the multiplication of private television companies and the number of programs offered has increased⁵.

CONCLUSION

Today, the internationalization of cultural life has several correlated aspects: the westernization of ways of life in countries experiencing economic expansion, the intensification of movements of exchange between countries and different continents and the speed of diffusion of cultural items, the world wide application of the commerce of works of art and outlets for the widespread use and appeal of audiovisual and musical production. Therefore cultural competition between the most developed nations and between their respective artistic industries and markets becomes more fierce. We assume that in this process of growing internationalization and interdependance of cultural markets and trends of consumption, the largest and leading cities play a major role as key places for the exchange flows.

The equation of this internationalization of art is the search for rapid artistic and financial success, over a vast geographic zone. For the briefer the life of innovation, the greater the size of its market, open to increase the profits derived from the innovation. Still it is necessary to encourage innovations and to select the most viable ones, to dispose of a vast and dynamic internal market before exploiting the innovations approved by an overwhelming majority of the internal market on an international, even worls-wide, scale.

A strengthened interdependence between agents of the market and agents of the cultural field accompanies the internationalization of artistic creation and its different markets, notably in the sector of elite art and the hermetic tendencies of contemporary creation. Being in the big cities responds to the dual command of economic support and the cultural promotion of the works and the artists who are confronting the test of international competition.

The noteworthy fact is that both popular culture and elite culture have strong bases of internationalization; musical expression of social minorities leads to new styles in the music world mass market as well as avant-garde movements in painting or serious music find support and audience and are quickly discussed in the economically developed countries of the world. Although cosmopolitism may seem sometimes imperialistic, especially when one country dominates a field of production (for example America in movie, tv and pop music production), nobody could seriously reject as symbols of Cultural imperialism a Debussy or Messiaen concert played by the NHK Symphony Orchestra of Tokyo and conducted by Hiroyski Hiwaki or a Matisse show in New York sponsored by IBM or a celebration of Orson Welles' genius in Paris sponsored by Fuji Corporation and so on.

We can go one step further: clearly, there is not only an increasing internationalization in the cultural industries, which strongly shapes the mass market and consumer behavior in the cultural sphere, but also an increasing demand for internationalization. In the high culture sphere, the most active producers, mediators and consumers in the main cities belong to what could be called an international art world : they are well informed, much better informed about artistic events and innovations in these cities taken together than dwellers from each city with other backgrounds about what is happening in their respective metropolis. These art world members are connected with a large number of social circles and informational channels, which give them the richest set of opportunities to discover and adopt innovations, to know about emerging cultural trends and to evaluate them, while promoting some and abandoning others before choosing new ones.

On one side, elite and popular culture are produced and consumed in separated worlds and differ in content, conditions of production and level of institutionnalisation today much more than ever before. Moreover, concentration of talents, networks and organisations such as those found in dominant cities stimulates a high level of innovation through fragmentation of each sphere into small more or less competing cultural subworlds. On the other side, however, a certain level of interaction between the two spheres is a functional requisit in the culture production process such as it operates in the performing arts, in the publishing and the film industries or in the media. And both popular and elite culture have become increasingly internationalized.

As a result, global cities experience a potential or actual tension between a plurality of cultures and cultural cosmopolitanism or universalism. Globalization extends therefore to culture in several ways, depending of the type of culture under consideration. In the elite and avant-garde sphere as well as in the fashion industry, highly connected transnational artworlds convey innovations, tastes and life styles that disseminate more or less rapidly in the national markets. But globalization also means quasi instantaneous world-wide distribution of standardized cultural commodities by a growing diversity of electronic and non-electronic media. Finally, globalization refers to what Appadurai calls ethnoscapes, that is the continual movement of tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles and guestworkers. Global cities can be seen as ecological sites of cultural plurality according to these different meanings, because of the critical mass effects of the institutions, individuals (producers, consumers, distributors, mediators, culture market professionals) and populations (social groups, ethnic minorities, flows of tourists, etc.) involved in the running of this multidimensional globalization.

Notes

- Cf. R. MOULIN, J-C PASSERON et al., Les Artistes, La Documentation Française, 1985;
 P-M. MENGER, Le Paradoxe du musicien, Paris, Flammarion, 1983;
 M. VESSILIER Le métier d'auteur, Paris, Dunod, 1983;
 M. VESSILIER, "La démogaphie des créateurs", in Population, 2, 1989, p. 291-310.
- 2. On this point see the very enlightening works of E. FRIEDBERG and P. URFALINO, Le jeu du catalogue, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1984, and "La décentralisation culturelle au service de la culture nationale", in R. MOULIN, ed. Sociologie de l'art, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1986; and P. URFALINO, "La Municipalisation de la culture", in F. CHAZEL, ed. Pratiques culturelles et politiques de la culture, Bordeaux, Éditions de la MSH, 1987.
- 3. Cf. R. MOULIN, "Le marché et le musée", in *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 1986, XVL-3, and R. MOULIN, *L'artiste*, *l'institution et le marché*, Paris, Flammarion, 1992.
- 4. Europe is the biggest importer of television programs, in 1989, 90% of non-european television came from the United States, 5% from Japan and 5% from the rest of the world. In value, Europe bought programs from outside its borders for 4,5 billions francs, and exported its own for a sum of 1,1 billion francs, a commercial deficit of 3,4 billions francs. Japan too is weak: its exportation of programs rose to 450 million francs in 1989, while importing 1,3 billion francs worth. North America generated a commercial strength exceeding 5,2 billions francs in 1989, securing 75% of world-wide exportation, which shows the preponderance of the United States' production industry and the effectiveness of its commercial policy. (Statistics taken from the report "Exporter les programmes français de télévision", Sofirad, 1990).
- 5. The percentage of programs imported by television station greatly increased in the 1980's, with the growth of the available supply:

Portion (in%) of imported programs in the following countries	1973	1983	1988
France	9	16	33
Great Britain	13	25	31
Italy	13	20	46
USA	1	2	3
Japan	11	10	12