Résumé
I tentatively explore in an informal way the concept of global expressivism and focus in particular on expressivism about meaning attributions and truth. I indicate that expressivists about meaning should not deny that there are meanings—they should not embrace a first-order nihilism about the subject-matter of domains of discourse that are treated expressively—but rather they should rather accept a second-order nihilism that undercuts inquiry into the true nature of what we are talking about when we talk about meanings. I then address the question of the nature of truth-bearers and the force-sense distinction. Instead of offering a theory of what truth-bearers are, in adopting global expressivism we attempt to give an account of what speakers express when they assert or judge that a sentence is truth-apt and expresses a content that is assertoric. Seeking a theory of what truth-bearers really are—what theoretic model we should accept about their real or ultimate natures—is one that is undercut by the expressivist orientation.
