



Charles Cotton's 1674 book, *The Compleat*

International Symposium
**FREE WILL
AND CAUSATION**

September 22-23, 2016

Room 2

One major challenge philosophers face in order to understand human free will is to locate it within the realm of natural causes: is free agency compatible or incompatible with the fabric of causal relations? Does free will entail a different type of causation, or can we view it in terms of natural causes? Should we favor agent rather than event causation? Answering such questions depends largely on the - Humean, Reidian, neo-Aristotelian, etc.- account of causation one adopts.

The aim of the conference is to investigate such issues in the light of the most recent theories of free will and causation.

Thursday, September 22,

- 09:30 **Claudine TIERCELIN**, Collège de France:
Opening
- 09:40 **Richard HOLTON**, University of Cambridge:
Cause and Agency
- 10:40 Break
- 11:00 **Kadri VIHVELIN**, University of Southern California:
**How the Laws Constrain: Causation,
Counterfactuals, and Free Will**
- 12:00 **Ghislain LE GOUSSE**, Université de Nantes:
Three Arguments Against Conditionalism
- 13:00 Lunch
- 14:30 **Carolina SARTORIO**, University of Arizona:
Actual Causes and Free Will
- 15:30 **Patrick TODD**, University of Edinburgh:
**Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Different
Sides of the Same Overly Optimistic Coin**
- 16:30 Break
- 16:50 **Helen BEEBEE**, University of Manchester:
How to Perform Miracles

Friday, September 23,

- 09:30 **Timothy O'CONNOR**, Indiana University:
Reasons and Causes
- 10:30 Break
- 10:50 **Jean-Baptiste GUILLON**, Collège de France:
The Epistemology of Agent-Causation
- 11:50 **Jean-Pascal ANFRAY**, ENS Paris:
Suárez on the Notion of a Free Cause
- 13:00 Lunch
- 14:30 **Cyrille MICHON**, Université de Nantes:
**Responsibility for Consequences and Alternative
Possibilities**
- 15:30 **Joana RIGATO**, Champalimaud Research Center:
**Agent-Causation and Supervenience: How You
Can Have One Without Giving Up the Other**
- 16:30 Break
- 16:50 **Derk PEREBOOM**, Cornell University:
**Event-Causation, Luck, and the Disappearing
Agent Objection**