Abstract
The first conference focused on "interpersonal social epistemology": this involves individual epistemic agents who, having heard statements or opinions from other agents, respond to them by forming or revising their own opinions. The basic case is that of an agent who, having heard the testimony of another, decides to accept his statement as true. The theory of testimony has been discussed here. When is an agent justified in doing so? What kind ofevidence does he need to be justified in relying on the testimony of others? Does he need to know how reliable the speaker is on the subject in question? We often trust people we've never met before. Perhaps it's enough to know that people are reliable in general. Is such knowledge necessary? One particular class oftestimonial evidence isexpert testimony. When are neophytes (in a given field) justified in believing an expert? When they hear two experts pronounce contradictory judgements, which one should they believe, and why? We have proposed and examined five criteria forsuperior expertise. A second problem of interpersonal social epistemology is that of disagreement between peers. What do we do when another person, whom we respect as a peer and who has exactly the same data(evidence) as we do, has a different opinion about a proposition? They believe it, but we don't. All the data has been shared, and yet we disagree. Is it reasonable for each of us to maintain our position in the face of the other party's opposing view? Or should each change his or her belief and take a step in the other's direction? What does reason require?
