Abstract
The enactment of laws to curb the corruption of morals reveals the presence of vice. It is also interpreted in opposition to a bygone era when harmony and virtue were such that laws were unnecessary. The number of laws grows in proportion to the extent of luxury, and some impose severe limitations on economic freedom. However, the impression of an increase in legislation needs to be put into perspective in light of two factors : on the one hand, the timocratic nature of the regime, where the level of wealth conditioned the extent of participation in political life; on the other, the much earlier existence of norms limiting the use of wealth, already present in the XII Tables. Since wealth was the foundation of the social hierarchy, any risk of dissipation had to be ruled out.
From the end of the 3rd century BC, a succession of laws on the use of wealth was passed. The legislator interfered in areas of private life. For example, the lex Claudia of 218 BC forbade any senator to manage a ship containing more than three hundred amphorae, thus prohibiting almost all maritime trade. Then came the lex Oppia of 215, a plebiscite prohibiting women from owning more than half an ounce of gold, wearing multicolored clothing or driving around the capital in a horse-drawn vehicle. Similarly, in the area of wills, other laws limit the amount of bequests that can substantially reduce the inheritance passed on to the heir, and exclude women from inheritance above a certain asset value. The main aim of these laws, and others that followed them, was to preserve social equilibrium by preserving heritage. In addition to these, there were the so-called somptuaires - sumptus - laws aimed at curbing the luxury of banquets organized to increase personal clienteles. The aim was to guarantee a certain equality in the competition for power, and to prevent a particularly wealthy part of the elite from distinguishing itself further from the rest of the oligarchy. Some laws therefore limited the number of guests and the amount spent on banquet meals. But others, such as the lex Fannia, limit the expenditure for each meal and even prohibit certain dishes. In this context, three famous jurists, P. Mucius Scaevola, Q. Aelius Tubéron and P. Rutilius Rufus, managed to circumvent these limitations by buying cheaper food from their own farmers, buying it cheaply from their fisherman slaves, or negotiating with people they had done favors for. In this way, they managed to obey the law while satisfying their palates (Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, 6, 274c-e). This raises questions about jurists' real adherence to the political ideals pursued by the law, as well as the delicate balance between formal respect for it and its circumvention.
