Abstract
In judgment, according to Frege, there are two things: the content of thought, which we "grasp" (conception), and a second mental operation consisting in accepting the content, holding it to be true (judgment). The contents of thought are intrinsically devoid of force and therefore "neutral" in the absence of an additional operation of evaluation leading to acceptance or rejection. In fiction, this additional operation does not take place.
As both Peter Geach and Michael Dummett have pointed out, this is not the only possible conception. Geach points out that, for Spinoza, the contents of thought are intrinsically assertive: we cannot represent something without positing its reality, without affirming it. Within this theoretical framework, cases where force is absent can be seen as cases where the intrinsic force of the content is cancelled out or inhibited by an element of context. This position, which can be reinterpreted from a simulationist perspective, has been rediscovered and developed in recent years by a group of philosophers of language led by Peter Hanks.
Psychologists, too, have revived their interest in Spinozist theory. Daniel Gilbert contrasts two models of the belief fixation process. According to the Cartesian model, conception comes first, and is a matter for the understanding. Judgment, i.e., the acceptance (or rejection) of the content, is a second operation, the responsibility of the will. In the Spinozist model, on the other hand, there is no conception without acceptance, but a content conceived and therefore accepted in the first instance can be rejected in the second.
Matravers defends the Cartesian two-stage model (conception first, acceptance or rejection in a second stage) for what he calls representation, as distinguished from perceptual confrontation. However, we can also adopt a generalized Spinozist perspective, i.e. one that applies to communication as well as perception. Gilbert shows through experiments that we believe by default the propositions we conceive or understand, and that it takes extra effort to reject those that are doubtful. This position is reminiscent of that of philosopher Thomas Reid, according to whom credulity is an instinct.
The Reid-Gilbert theory has been criticized by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. According to Sperber, far from being an instinct, the trust we place in the testimony of others is made possible by a disposition he calls vigilance, which consists in constantly and automatically checking the credibility of both the source of the communication and the content communicated. Once again, however, a compromise position appears possible. We can admit, with Reid and Gilbert, that people believe what they are told by default, just as they believe the testimony of their senses by default, while recognizing the existence of specific vigilance mechanisms for communication that can mitigate the harmful effects of automatic credulity by inhibiting it. Moreover, doxastic inhibition can be present from the outset. For example, when we read a novel, we know we're reading a novel. You don't begin by believing what you're reading until you realize it's fiction. The compromise position remains Spinozist, however, in that the subject's mental state is analyzed as resulting from the interaction of two forces: the doxastic force inherent in the content, and the inhibition of the latter.
