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The aim of this talk is to clear space for a new account of the value of epistemic justification. I argue that there are two constraints on such an account: it must explain both the motivational force of justification-considerations and their normativity. …

Le deuxième cours est d’abord revenu sur la force de nos intuitions essentialistes et sur la mauvaise presse dont, dans le même temps, souffre l’essentialisme. En effet, si nous avons tous l’impression que les choses auraient pu être autrement qu’elles ne …

Some philosophers argued that the concept of belief involves a truth-norm according to which a belief is correct if and only if true. The truth-norm has been the object of some criticisms. In particular, in my talk I consider three criticisms directed to …

Belief aims at the truth and so beliefs that do not fit the facts are defective. In what sense are they defective? The orthodox view seems to be that these beliefs are defective because they don't constitute knowledge. Those who accept this view tend to …

Four highly correlated theses I would like to defend: Everything but knowledge is a constitutive failure of belief. This is how the intuition that knowing that P has more epistemic value than merely truly believing that P should be explained But: When I …

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Ici, les questions fondamentales ont trait aux impacts du dérèglement climatique (fonte des glaciers, désertification, aléas météorologiques, etc.), de la pollution de l’air, des sols et des cours d’eau, de la destruction massive des écosystèmes …

Jean-François Toussaint est directeur de l’IRMES (Institut de Recherche bioMédicale et d'Épidémiologie du Sport) qu’il a créé en 2006 à l’Insep avec l’université Paris Descartes, l’Inserm et l’AP-HP. Ses travaux sont consacrés au contexte de la …

According to robust virtue epistemology , knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent’s cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. It is argued that a fundamental problem which faces this view is its inability to …

My concern in this paper is with a certain, pervasive picture of epistemic justification. On this picture, acquiring justification for believing something is essentially a matter of minimising one’s risk of error – so one is justified in believing …

Justification is often understood as a standard of appraisal that entails responsibility. But what grounds our responsibility for our beliefs? In this paper I argue that responsibility for belief is a matter of reasons-responsiveness, and essentially …