En libre accès, dans la limite des places disponibles


I tentatively explore in an informal way the concept of global expressivism and focus in particular on expressivism about meaning attributions and truth. I indicate that expressivists about meaning should not deny that there are meanings—they should not embrace a first-order nihilism about the subject-matter of domains of discourse that are treated expressively—but rather they should rather accept a second-order nihilism that undercuts inquiry into the true nature of what we are talking about when we talk about meanings. I then address the question of the nature of truth-bearers and the force-sense distinction. Instead of offering a theory of what truth-bearers are, in adopting global expressivism we attempt to give an account of what speakers express when they assert or judge that a sentence is truth-apt and expresses a content that is assertoric. Seeking a theory of what truth-bearers really are—what theoretic model we should accept about their real or ultimate natures—is one that is undercut by the expressivist orientation.

Stephen Barker

Stephen Barker has been a professor at the University of Nottingham since 2002. He finished his PhD at the University of Melbourne in 1996, and has had postdoc positions in Mexico (UNAM), Monash University, and University of Tasmania. He works on philosophy of language, metaphysics, metametaphysics, and Buddhist philosophy.


Stephen Barker

Université de Nottingham