Symposium co-organized by Prof. Samantha Besson, Chair of International Law of Institutions, and Prof. Henry Laurens, Chair of Contemporary History of the Arab World.
June 13, 2025, from 9:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., Maurice-Halbwachs Amphitheater, Marcelin-Berthelot Site. Free admission, subject to availability.
First declared a crime by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 and prohibited by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide is often considered the “crime of crimes.” Unlike the three other major crimes that have since been recodified in the statutes of various international criminal tribunals (including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) of July 17, 1998), the definition of the crime of genocide has never changed. By comparison, and until recently, it has also been invoked less frequently. Consequently, its various elements have been interpreted even less frequently in international case law, whether by ad hoc international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia or by the ICC. From this consistency in the definition of the crime and its comparatively limited interpretation, some have inferred that it possesses one of the highest levels of normative force in international law, a value of historical recognition of the crimes committed, and—related to this—a primarily preventive role in its prohibition.
Over the past two decades, however, a significant shift has taken place thanks to international and subsequently national criminal trials for genocide, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Alongside these trials, the violation of States’ obligation under international law to prevent genocide has also been invoked and clarified with increasing frequency in practice. Consequently, the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has expanded regarding the obligation to prevent genocide (e.g., Croatia v. Serbia (1999–2015) and Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (1993–2007)). The jurisdiction clause in Article IX of the 1948 Convention allows any State Party to the Convention to refer a dispute concerning its interpretation to the ICJ. An increasing number of States are invoking this provision, including to gain access to the ICJ. Consequently, this jurisdiction clause currently forms the basis for no fewer than five contentious proceedings against States and, as a result, for numerous upcoming orders and judgments related to the situations in Myanmar, Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan: Sudan v. United Arab Emirates (2025–); Nicaragua v. Germany (2024–), South Africa v. Israel (2023–), Ukraine v. Russian Federation (2022–), and The Gambia v. Myanmar (2019–).
In light of these rapid developments in international practice regarding genocide and the new questions they raise for the conceptualization of the “crime of crimes,” a legal and historical assessment is necessary. Given the central role that history plays in various ways within legal reasoning regarding genocide (e.g., as sources of customary law, evidence, causation, or even the attribution of conduct or liability), it is worthwhile to undertake this review in dialogue with historians. The 1948 Convention, moreover, invites legal scholars to engage with historians—and indeed participates in their debates—since it acknowledges in its preamble that “genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity in all periods of history.” The value of such an assessment also extends to history, if only because history is often written within or through the justice system. Furthermore, the question arises as to how the recent (legal) concept of genocide applies to the shifting realities of history, particularly at times and in places where large swaths of the past are experienced as still belonging to our present. The aim is not to deny the existence of mass exterminations in the past, but to determine whether the concept of genocide provides an additional element of historical understanding of the processes under study.
During this one-day conference, legal scholars and historians—specialists in genocide—will, we hope, engage in a fruitful dialogue. Their discussions will center on four questions of common interest for understanding the crime of genocide from the perspectives of both disciplines or fields of practice: 1) The prohibition of genocide: from acts of violence and “black legends” to a crime under customary law; 2) Perpetrators of genocide: individual, collective, and/or institutional; 3) Conditions of genocide: genocidal intentions and/or processes; and 4) Justice and truth regarding genocide: “a past that won’t go away” and “assassins of memory.” The examination of these issues will, of course, provide an opportunity to revisit various cases of genocide throughout history, including those in the history of international law.
Speakers: Omer Bartov (Brown University); Monique Chemillier-Gendreau (Paris Cité University); Christian Ingrao (CESPRA, École des hautes études en sciences sociales/CNRS); Mark Levene (University of Southampton); Rafaëlle Maison (IEDP, Paris-Saclay University); Jean-Clément Martin (IHMC, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University); Guénaël Mettraux (Specialized Chambers for Kosovo, The Hague & University of Galway); William Schabas (Middlesex University, London).